INTRODUCTION
MANY EMPIRICAL ANALYSES of income inequality rely heavily on measures of inequality which are decomposable in the sense that, if the population of incomeearners is broken down into a certain number of subgroups, the inequality measure for the total population can be expressed as a sum of the inequality measures "within" its subgroups, weighted by coefficients depending on their aggregate characteristics, and of the inequality existing "between" them. The variance coefficient and Theil's coefficient are such decomposable measures of inequality and they have been extensively used in identifying and explaining the main sources of inequality in a given population.2 By contrast, we shall see that the Gini coefficient is not decomposable in the sense above and has seldom been used 3 in this type of exercise.
If decomposability is a very convenient property, any decomposable measure is not necessarily a satisfactory index of income inequality. The variance, for instance, is not neutral with respect to a scale change of the whole income distribution, which might not seem a very "objective" property for an inequality measure. Likewise, the least normative property that might be expected from an inequality measure is to decrease with any income transfer from rich to less rich people (Pigou-Dalton condition) and it is well-known that some conventional inequality measures do not satisfy that condition.
It seems interesting, under those circumstances, to investigate all inequality measures which are decomposable while satisfying a set of basic requirements. This is what we intend to do in the present paper. Namely, we look for all measures 1 I thank an anonymous referee and A. Shorrocks for useful comments. I remain responsible for any remaining error. 2 For a good example of the use of the decomposability of Theil's coefficient, see [5] . The use of the decomposability of the variance of incomes or income logarithms, on the other hand, is implicit in the countless regression analyses of income distribution data. 3 The numerous attempts to disaggregate the Gini coefficient [4, 8, 9, 10] shows the relevance and importance of the decomposability property in applied work on income inequality. A proof of the non-decomposability of the Gini coefficient and other inequality measures based on an incomeranking is given at the end of Section 2. The continuity requirement seems natural since an infinitesimal change in the value of an individual income may be expected to produce only an infinitesimal change in the inequality measure. The differentiability condition might seem more restrictive since it leads, in particular, to elimination of the wide family of measures in which individual incomes enter with their rank in the whole distribution and which are not differentiable everywhere (Gini coefficient, interquantiles mean incomes ratios, etc.). This is not a serious problem, however, because we shall see that such measures are generally not decomposable. 4 The symmetry requirement corresponds to the idea that the personality of income earners is irrelevant in the measure of inequality (anonymity rule). This seems justified in the context of income inequality but it might not be if a broader definition of economic inequality were considered. The income-zero-homogeneity property, on the other hand, means that the inequality measure is invariant when all incomes are multiplied by the same scalar. Interestingly enough, we shall see that this income-homogeneity property, together, with the undemanding "symmetry axiom for population" (which requires that the inequality of a given distribution be the same as that of the distribution obtained by replicating any number of times each individual income in the initial distribution), implies also a kind of "population-zero-homogeneity" for decomposable inequality measures. It must be pointed out, however, that, if incomezero-homogeneity seems justified for an "objective" inequality measure, it is 5 debatable from a normative point of view.
Finally, we are led to consider two definitions of the decomposability property. First, the inequality of population of individual incomes can be expressed as a function of the inequality within its subgroups and of their aggregate characteristics. This definition corresponds to some kind of "aggregativity" property and permits some decomposition of the total inequality. As it has been presented above and as it is used in empirical works, however, decomposability requires a little more than this general aggregativity property. Namely, it requires some additivity in the decomposition of inequality and we shall focus on this "additive decomposability" property in this paper.
It will appear that additive decomposability is equivalent to expressing the total inequality of a population as the sum of a weighted average of the inequality within subgroups of the population and of the inequality existing between them, although weighting coefficients do not necessarily sum to one. It is clear, then, that additively decomposable inequality measures will differ only by the weight given to the inequalities within the various subgroups of the population. Naturally, the most appealing candidates for this weighting system are the population and income shares of the subgroups. This leads to two distinct definitions of the decomposability property: the "population weighted decomposability" and the "income weighted decomposability."
Based on those definitions our calculations yield the interesting result that there is only one inequality measure consistent with each concept of decomposability. The only measure satisfying the "population weighted decomposability" is somewhat original and has seldom been used though, as we will show, it is quite appealing. This measure is simply the average logarithm of the individual incomes expressed as a proportion of the mean income of the population.6 The only measure consistent with the "income weighted decomposability" is Theil's entropy coefficient.
The preceding measures are only particular cases of the additive decomposability property. In the last section of the paper we investigate some measures consistent with more general weighting systems in the decomposability definition and also the 'income weighted' and 'population weighted' decomposable measures which are homogeneous of any degree. Quite naturally, the resulting measures refer more explicitly to normative judgements than do the average logarithm or Theil's coefficients. On the other hand, the decomposability property permits us to express those judgements in an interesting way. 
This implies, in particular:
Il(x)=0 foranyx.
Let us now define the concept of "aggregativity". That definition of the contribution of the inequality within each group i to the total inequality might seem somewhat ambiguous. Those contributions do not necessarily sum to Im the total contribution of the 'within-group' inequality defined in (1). Under these conditions, there might be some contradiction between the fact that, separately, each group i contributes Im to the total inequality and the fact that, jointly, they also contribute some additional inequality since Xi I" # Imw. The contradiction is only apparent. The point is simply that the preceding argument relies on the implicit assumption that inequalities within groups are additive whereas they are not necessarily so in general. Empirically, however, there is no doubt that it is that additivity property that is expected in a "decomposable" measure. So, we shall adopt the following definition. The rest of the present paper will mostly focus upon those additively decomposable measures. For the sake of simplicity, however, we will generally omit the word "additively" and simply refer to those measures as "decomposable." The additivity property given in Definition 3 implies that decomposable measures satisfy an aggregative property much more specific than (A). Notice that we would have found the same property assuming In homogeneous of any degree a in incomes, provided that a would be independent of n. Notice also that the income-homogeneity condition is necessary to get the populationhomogeneity property. Without the income-homogeneity property, the symmetry axiom for population would simply write: G (rYj,rn,;rY,rn)=G(Yi,n,; Y,n) and it would not be possible to get (Dh). It must be pointed out, finally, that the preceding argument applies also to the aggregativity property. When the measure is income-zero-homogeneous, the Yi's and the ni's in (A) can be replaced by the vi's and the wi's. 7 We have now proven that (additively) decomposable inequality measures could be expressed as the sum of the inequality existing between subgroups of a population and of a kind of 'weighted average' of the inequality within those groups, although the 'weights' used in this averaging do not necessarily sum up to one. When the measure is assumed to be zero-homogeneous in incomes, on the other hand, the 'weight' of a group depends homogeneously upon its shares of the total income and of the total population. It is clear, then, that decomposable inequality measures will differ only by the weighting systems f(vi, wi). From that point of view, the two most obvious candidates are naturally f(vi, wi) = vi and g(vi, wi) = wi or, respectively, 'income-weighted' and 'population-weighted' decomposable measures and we shall devote the next two sections of this paper to them.
Before looking at those particular measures, it might be useful to think a little about the differentiability condition we have imposed at the beginning of this paper to see how restrictive it could actually be. In this respect, it must be stressed that, until now, we have not really used that condition. Proposition 1 calls only for the differentiability of aggregative measures with respect to within-group inequalities and such differentiability does not seem too restrictive, a priori. The rest of the paper, however, will rely heavily upon differentiability with respect to individual incomes.
Among If the Gini coefficient were aggregative in the sense of (A), the total inequality measure would be invariant with such transfers. But, clearly, it is sufficient to assume that the rank of individuals ji, ki, and 1i in the whole population are J, K, L such that:
L-J li-ji in order for the aggregate Gini coefficient to be affected by those transfers. So, the Gini coefficient is not 'aggregative' in the sense of (A).
More generally, the same argument applies to all measures based upon an income-ranking such that rank-preserving inequality-invariant transfers depend on the rank of transferors and transferees. For those measures, it will always be possible to construct cases where inequality-invariant transfers in one subgroup of the population will change the total inequality measure. The problem comes naturally from the overlapping of the income rankings in two subgroups. This property can easily be checked for all nondifferentiable "income-ranking based" measures indicated above and loosens substantially the restrictiveness of the differentiability assumption under which we shall work now.8 It must be stressed, moreover, that we do not actually need, in what follows, inequality measures to be differentiable everywhere. Most of the arguments we will be using apply to the "income-ranking based" measures we have just considered in any region where they are differentiable. 8 Notice, however, that Rawls' criterion leads to an inequality measure which may be considered as a "ranking-based" measure which is nevertheless aggregative. 
POPULATION-WEIGHTED DECOMPOSABLE MEASURES
According to what precedes, we want to find the inequality measures which are differentiable, symmetric, and homogeneous of degree zero in all incomes, and which satisfy the Pigou-Dalton and following conditions: That the inequality measure L has seldom been used in applied works on income distribution is somewhat surprising because it has very much to commend it. Besides the fact that it is decomposable (as already noticed by Theil [13] ) and satisfies the basic properties of an inequality measure, L lends itself to a very simple interpretation in terms of social welfare. In the utilitarian framework, the social welfare function is the sum of identical concave individual utility functions. If we choose the logarithm form for those utility functions, L is simply the difference between the maximum social welfare for a given total income, which corresponds to the equalitarian distribution, and the actual social welfare. It is the 'distance' between the actual and the 'optimal' situation. In other words, the inequality measure L is the same as Theil's coefficient except that the roles of the wi's and vi's are inverted.1"
SOME OTHER DECOMPOSABLE

MEASURES
With respect to the decomposability property (Dh), the income-weighted and population-weighted measures have the property that the weights of the within-group inequalities in the total inequality sum to one. In that sense, it can be said that the total 'within' inequality is truly a weighted average of the inequality within the subgroups of the total population. One may wonder, under these conditions, whether that intuitively appealing property is satisfied by measures other than L and T. The answer is negative. PROPOSITION inequality in rich groups matter more than in poor groups and by how much. From that point of view, the measure L does not make any distinction between groups, whereas T assigns to each group a weight which is proportional to its relative income. One might very well make the opposite normative judgement, however, and require that the weight of a group in the total inequality be a decreasing function of its relative income. A simple general inequality measure satisfying that condition, for instance, could be based upon the weighting function We might also look at measures which are not zero-homogeneous, or in other words, at measures of inequality which are not invariant to a change in the scale of the distribution. Such measures would correspond to the idea that inequality is more burdensome for a poor than a rich population or inversely. If we restrict ourselves to measures which are homogeneous of some degree a (with a $ 0), the argument of Sections 3 and 4 may be generalized to get the corresponding "population-weighted" and "income-weighted" decomposable measures. They are close to Pb above and may be written, respectively, a (Yi) - 
1], a n i=i (y)
To conclude this analysis we might go back to our definition of "aggregativity" to notice the interesting property that any transformation of a decomposable measure by a monotonic function gives a measure of inequality which is aggre-gative.14 This explains why no reference has been made until now to Atkinson's measure, which is often considered as decomposable. It can be seen that Atkinson's measure is a Eransformation of Pb above and, therefore, that it is aggregative. But it is not (additively) decomposable which explains the ambiguities found by the authors who have studied the decomposition of that measure.'5
CONCLUSION
The main results obtained in the above analysis can be summarized as follows (see Table I Although these results are interesting, they rely on the restricted definition we have given to the concept of decomposability. "Aggregativity" would appear, a priori, as a much more powerful and practical concept. As we have seen in the case of more general weighting systems for decomposable measures, however, a careful normative analysis of the aggregativity property would be necessary before trying to generalize the results obtained in the present paper to that concept. Identifying this expression of I2(y2, y3) with its symmetric permits us to determine all the constants which appear in (5). This tedious operation shows that all these constants are necessarily nil if , and y are simultaneously strictly positive. This argument can be extended to any n > 3.
